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If the UK Government leaves the Single Market and Customs Union, without an agreed alternative 
that is acceptable to the EU, then border controls between NI and ROI will be unavoidable. Without 
such an agreed alternative, then the ‘frictionless’ border that all parties in these negotiations have 
committed to achieve is simply not possible. However, the ‘transition deal’, tentatively agreed 
between the UK and the EU at the Brussels summit in March 2018, offers the prospect of some 
form of continuing regulatory alignment between NI and ROI after Brexit. This implies the creation 
of a border between the island of Ireland and GB, rather than between NI and ROI. Time will tell if 
such a proposal is both realistic and acceptable to the various parties involved. The idea that the 
UK can ‘cherry-pick’ those features of the existing Customs Union that it likes, and discard those it 
dislikes, is entirely unrealistic.
The eastern side of Europe has 137 land border crossings along a border spanning 3,720 miles. 
By contrast there are currently 275 border crossings between NI and ROI, along a border spanning 
300 miles. The vast majority of NI / ROI border crossings are small, minor roads and tracks, which 
make their ‘policing’ unrealistic and unfeasible. This is why, during the conflict in NI (often referred 
to as the ‘Troubles’), from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, there were only 20 border crossings. The 
imposition of a hard Brexit will require the inspection not only of documents but also of goods and, 
critically, foodstuffs at border crossings, in order to provide public health and safety protection and 
deter illegality. This will inevitably add costs for food business operators in NI and ROI. 
There is currently no physical border between NI and ROI. There is therefore currently no infrastructure 
for dealing with any new border and customs checks that might become necessary, and no 
published or intimated UK Government plans for what this might look like or how it might work 





Although this paper relates specifically to Northern Ireland (NI), it is also highly relevant to the rest of the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU). It will also be of interest to the Republic of Ireland (ROI). 
Food is a key output of and central to the economies of both NI and the ROI. NI exports £1.15bn-worth of food 
to the EU, about 70% of which goes to/through the ROI. On the other hand, Great Britain (GB)b  is the biggest 
single market for the NI food and drink processing sector. The NI agri-food sector employs 100,000 people, 
and the food and drink manufacturing sector is NI’s most important manufacturing industry. NI agri-food will 
be more adversely affected by a hard Brexit than other parts of the UK. 
Each year c.680,000 tonnes of food flow into NI from GB, and 680,000 tonnes also flow in the opposite 
direction, NI to GB. Any decision taken by the UK Government to come out of the Customs Union and the 
Single Market (upon Brexit) without a suitable and agreed replacement is likely to have powerful, destabilising 
consequences for the integrated nature of food supply, trade and access within NI for many years to come.
There is currently no formal UK food plan for Brexit. In NI, power sharing is currently in abeyance and, 
therefore, there is no political voice in terms of future arrangements for NI food. This policy vacuum is 
worrying.
b Within this Briefing, Great Britain refers to England, Scotland and Wales.
NI’s public health infrastructure will require considerable investment if it is to be able effectively 
to protect public health in NI and address likely delays in the food chain that could result in food 
perishing and/or exceeding ‘use by’ dates in the event of a hard Brexit.
The aspirations of some politicians for technology to resolve food inspections and quality controls 
at borders are vague and unrealistic. Technological solutions may or may not be possible in the 
future but they do not exist at present. Furthermore, technological solutions cannot replace the 
need for food inspection by qualified and competent food professionals.
Customs clearance cannot and should not be conflated with the separate need for health checks. 
Customs clearance tracks the goods as they cross borders, to apply tariffs or other traceability 
features, and to answer questions such as: Where has the food come from? Where is it going? Is it 
legal? Safety and health checks at borders are frontline public health measures designed to ensure 
that the food is fit for human consumption: Is it safe? Is it what it says it is? Is it fraudulent? Proper 
food inspection requires someone to look inside lorries and make judgements about critical food 
safety and standards. To suggest that there is no need for such checks leaves the policy door wider 
open both for unsafe food to enter the system and for criminal and fraudulent activities.
Food inspection bodies, Environmental Health practitioners, Port Health Officers, Customs Officers 
and other trade and health-related professionals cannot resolve political difficulties, nor should 
responsibility for resolving practicalities be placed at their door. The responsibilities of such 
professionals are to the common good, including the public’s safety and health. This means that 
local authorities, relevant actors in the food system and all democratic bodies must be mindful 
of the implications for food, whether there is a hard Brexit or not. Leaving the Single Market and 
Customs Union – if that remains the likely outcome – requires contingency planning. 
The vast majority of food flowing to and from Europe from both ROI and NI is currently transported 
on one of the 39 daily sailings between GB and either NI or ROI, particularly via Heysham. In order 
for food movements (both exports and imports) between the island of Ireland and the EU to be 
direct, in other words not via GB, there would need to significantly increased direct sailings to and 
from the EU. There are currently only 13 sailings a week from the island of Ireland directly to Europe 
(North West France), with durations of 14-18 hours. Moving all of NI’s and ROI’s food exports and 
imports to and from the two French ports is clearly not realistic on either economic or political 
grounds.
NI currently has poor dietary health relative to other parts of the UK. The Single European Market 
has brought easier access to some health-supporting foods, notably fresh fruit and vegetables. 
Disrupting this flow could restrict NI consumers’ access to these foods, with impacts upon their 
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Policy-makers should explicitly acknowledge the importance of food flows to the continued stability 
and wellbeing of the people of NI. They must pay attention to food consumption, costs, trade, 
safety and public health, and to the intricate mechanics and structures which enable food flows 
and may be disrupted by Brexit.
The NI food system urgently needs some clear decisions to be taken by all sides in respect of ‘Food 
Brexit’. This important issue is not, at present, receiving the attention that it deserves, and this failure 
of food governance should not be allowed to continue. All three parties to the Brexit negotiations 
around the crucial question of the NI / ROI border, i.e., the UK Government, ROI Government and the 
EU authorities, should sit down together to produce a workable solution to the practical problems 
of cross-border food traffic. This solution is likely to be unique to the circumstances of the situation 
Prime Minister May’s commitment to a ‘frictionless border’ cannot be fudged. Either NI is in the 
Single Market and/or Customs Union (or an alternative that is mutually agreed by all parties) or it is 
not. If not, border controls, including food inspections, are inevitable (and should be prepared for).
All fissures of a political and ideological nature should be put aside to enable all parties central 
to the discussion to ‘think food’. The big Brexit-associated choices must be explored through the 
policy ‘lens’ of food and they are whether to:
 »  Reverse the current commitment to leave the Customs Union and Single Market; 
 »  Stay in the Customs Union in alignment with current EU rules and supply chain approaches; 
 »  Develop and agree on an alternative customs arrangement between the EU and the UK;
 »  Impose ‘Red Lines’ at some geographical point between the UK and the EU. 
Policy-makers, MPs and Select Committees should redouble efforts to encourage the UK Government 
to be open about its overall plans for food post-Brexit and to develop a specific Food Plan for NI 
within the context of Brexit. The lack of discussion about food (as opposed to agriculture) is a 
serious policy deficiency and options must be open, costed and explored.
The European Commission should seek clarification from the UK Government on the general food 
status of NI, particularly its reliance on food imports and exports. The European Commission must 
provide clear guidance to the NI consuming public and agri-food industries about the practical 
implications of options for food flows in and out of NI.
Members of the UK Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Government 
should pressurise the UK Government to keep NI’s borders with both the ROI and GB open and 
frictionless, not least since NI food flows come through their jurisdictions, and affect employment 
there.
Detailed plans for how food inspections might be resourced and managed post-Brexit are required, 
and the NI Select Committee, together with the EFRA Committee, should conduct an Inquiry into 
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clarification as to whether trials are under way or contracts have been signed for the development 
and delivery of any technological controls at borders. The Committees and MPs should also ask 
about feasibility, cost and function of such solutions.
The three dominant food retail companies in NI have particular responsibilities that go along with 
their economic power to prevent NI’s food system being cut off from both the ROI and GB. The 
extent of their forward planning options to address Brexit issues should be reviewed by open 
processes such as by a Select Committee. We urge the big food companies who currently ‘feed’ NI 
to redouble efforts to maintain good quality food flows into NI. 
Food industry forward contracts and purchasing agreements for supply in March 2019 are already 
commencing. Whatever the wider political decisions about the status of NI, there must be a 
reasonable period of adjustment where things carry on as before, and appropriate notice of change 
must be given to businesses to allow them to make the necessary arrangements. Disruption to 
food supplies would be socially, economically and politically unacceptable.
A key question is whether (and in what form) NI might have a ‘special arrangement’ on food 
regulations, in line with the current EU food safety regulatory regime and covering matters such as 
the use of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) and other features of the EU approach to 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) management. 
The UK Government’s civil contingencies (COBRA) system should be preparing for all eventualities 
arising from Brexit and those associated with a food Brexit should be included.  If the head of 
Dublin Port is already doing so, COBRA should do so too and any public reassurances given must 
be based on open evidence.
The UK Government and the Devolved Administrations should undertake and publish studies 
which calculate needs for resources, funding, technical equipment and scientific staff to provide 
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Back to Basics: why Food 
is a pivotal Brexit issue 
for Northern Ireland
The borders of the Republic of Ireland (ROI), North-
ern Ireland (NI), Wales and Scotland, along with 
their links with England and the European con-
tinent, barely featured in the Brexit Referendum 
debates within Great Britain (GB), though they did 
in NI. NI residents voted 56% to remain and 44% to 
leave1.  The failure to acknowledge the problem in 
GB was regrettable; but the issues were discussed 
on the island of Ireland (both in NI & ROI) as well as 
in rest of the EU Member States, where NI is seen 
as a key issue for the ongoing exit negotiations.2  
The reasons focus around the inescapable fact that 
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, an International 
Treaty, was negotiated and signed by both the UK 
and ROI Governments, built on the fact that all its 
signatories were EU members. Its importance and 
delicacy remain, although some in Westminster 
and Whitehall want to push it into the policy ‘long 
grass’, while others see it as a likely deal-breaker.3  
Macro-level politics are not the focus of this Brief-
ing, which is concerned with the impact Brexit will 
have on safety, trade and flow of food into and out 
of Northern Ireland, but it is important to acknowl-
edge the seriousness of the context within which 
our analysis has been developed. We note the 
Inquiry by the House of Commons Northern Ire-
land Affairs Committee (February 2018ff)4,  and the 
detailed attention to food trade matters being ac-
corded by several House of Lords Committees.5,6 We 
note, too, that the House of Commons ExEU Select 
Committee recently put NI as the first of 15 ‘tests’ it 
would apply to any agreement the UK Government 
concludes with the EU. It said: ‘The border between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland must 
remain open with no physical infrastructure or any 
related checks and controls, as agreed in the Phase 
1 Withdrawal Agreement.’7  This Briefing concen-
trates on food within that wider Brexit debate.
Food flows and the ‘food peace’
There is currently no formal UK food plan for Brexit; 
the DEFRA Secretary of State was due to publish 
a 25-year Food Plan, but it has been deferred 
repeatedly, now reputedly for good. In NI, power 
sharing is currently in abeyance and, therefore, 
there is no political voice in terms of future 
arrangements for NI food. This policy vacuum is 
worrying.
Food is a key output of and central to the 
economies of both NI and the ROI. Key points are 
that:
• Food is a hugely important source of trade 
between ROI, NI and GB. NI, for instance, 
exports £1.15bn-worth of food to the EU, 
about 70% of which goes to/through the ROI. 
Disruption could be economically significant 
to the NI economy.
• Agri-food sector exports account for 27% of 
NI food and drink processing sales, and ROI is 
the destination for 53% of export sales from 
the sector.8 
• 14% of NI exports are in farming and agri-
food products – 2% from farming and fishing 
sectors, plus 12% in processed agri-food and 
drink.9   
• Food and drink products are the largest 
commodities, by volume, carried in UK-
Registered Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) 
between NI and GB – 680,000 tonnes in each 
direction annually.10  
• Food, beverages and tobacco trade accounts 
for 49% of all cross-border activity from NI.11 
• NI agri-food has sales of £4bn and employs 
10% of all labour in NI.12 
• The most used and efficient route for ROI food 
exports is across the Irish Sea into Wales and 
thence to England and mainland Europe.
• The ROI is a major export market for UK food 
processors; and GB is the leading market for 
ROI exports and indeed the leading market for 
NI food products.
• Food industry contracts are mostly made 12 
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months in advance of delivery; thus dates had 
been agreed in March 2018 for food that will 
appear on UK shelves and tables from April 
2019 (after Brexit).
Metaphorical ‘Red Lines’ could 
become real, if there is a hard 
Food Brexit
The UK Prime Minister and others have raised the 
issue of where ‘Red Lines’ might be drawn. In her 
Lancaster House speech (17 January 2017), Mrs May 
said she wanted to maintain the ‘Common Travel 
Area’ between the ROI and the UK.13  This referred 
to the movement of people rather than goods. 
The speech (and others) revealed that the UK 
Government’s ‘Red Lines’ neglect the practicalities 
of food flows. On food, little has been said by the 
UK Government other than in the August 2017 
Customs White Paper, which rejected outright any 
border controls between NI and GB post-Brexit 
(p.10, para 45).14   
The UK Foreign Secretary’s Valentine’s Day 
speech in 2018 was silent about food, other than 
to reiterate jokes about the EU meddling with 
environmental standards, and expressing no desire 
to return post-Brexit to ‘some autarkic 1950s menu 
of spam and cabbage and liver’.15  The levity, at the 
expense of European culture and British austerity 
diets, might play well politically with some, but in 
the practical, dynamic world of the food supply 
chain, the lack of attention to detail was regrettable. 
He did not even acknowledge the potential impacts 
of border checks and tariffs. Unfortunately, in a 
subsequent interview with the BBC, he implied 
border crossings could be managed much as 
crossing between London Boroughs are in relation 
to London’s congestion charge, i.e. insignificant 
and imperceptible.16   
The UK Government has asserted that it wishes to 
retain the prevailing, unrestricted trade between NI 
and ROI, as well as between NI and GB. To achieve 
this there are three possible solutions. The UK 
remains within the Customs Union (and probably 
the Single Market too); the UK achieves a new 
form of regulatory alignment; or a new alternative 
is developed and agreed between all parties. It is 
important to be absolutely clear: if the UK leaves 
the Single Market and Customs Union, without an 
agreed alternative that is acceptable to the EU, then 
the frictionless border between NI and ROI (which 
all parties in these negotiations have committed 
to avoiding) is simply not achievable. However, the 
‘transition deal’, tentatively agreed between the UK 
and the EU at the Brussels summit in March 2018, 
offers the prospect of some form of continuing 
regulatory alignment between NI and ROI after 
Brexit (which implies the creation of a border 
between the island of Ireland and GB). Time will tell 
if such a proposal is both realistic and acceptable 
to the various parties involved. The idea that the 
UK can ‘cherry-pick’ those features of the existing 
Customs Union that it likes, and discard those it 
dislikes, is entirely unrealistic.17  
It needs to be clearly understood by all that the 
Good Friday Agreement was and still is based upon 
the two core jurisdictions involved, i.e. the UK and 
Ireland, both being in the European Union. The UK 
and ROI are currently both in the EU’s Single Market 
and Customs Union. The UK Government and the 
European Commission issued a Joint Report of 
December 8 201718 that outlined three scenarios:
• Scenario 1: No customs border either between 
NI and ROI or between NI and GB.
• Scenario 2: If no Brexit trade deal can be 
done, the UK is to ‘propose specific solutions 
to address the unique circumstances of the 
island of Ireland’, i.e. a bespoke agreement.
• Scenario 3: If no agreement can be reached 
at all, the default is to stick to ‘maintaining 
full alignment’ with ‘those rules of the Internal 
Market and the Customs Union which, 
now or in the future, support North-South 
cooperation, the all-island economy and the 
protection of the 1998 Agreement’.
This is the high-level political context in which 
Brexit is being negotiated. But what does it mean, 
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in practical terms, for food – and the people who 
grow, manufacture, trade, inspect and (not least) 
eat it? 
Borders exist in geographical terms only. They are 
effectively invisible. To re-impose food borders 
(barriers to the flow of foodstuffs and feed from 
one side of the border to the other) could/would 
require:
• The closure of most road crossing points 
between ROI and NI (because the nature of 
the majority of border crossings makes them 
very difficult, if not impossible, to monitor). 
• New inspection systems where there are none 
at present at the remaining crossings.
• An enlarged food inspection labour 
force and new technological systems to 
‘police’ the border, where such controls 
have been dismantled for over 20 years, 
thus engendering greater trust between 
communities and dispelling the legacy 
of the past, a factor which should not be 
underestimated.b
• New technologies to support cross-
border controls could be needed and 
such technologies are not yet available. 
The development of such schemes would 
require large-scale investment and extensive 
preparation and trialling. No contracts, to our 
knowledge, have been signed to enable such 
electronic systems to be put into place.
• Clarification of likely tariff differences. At 
present, ROI, NI and GB are all within one 
market; because there is no effective border, 
there are no tariffs between them. The retail 
trade association, the British Retail Consortium 
(BRC), has calculated that, if the UK moves 
ahead on a World Trade Organization (WTO) 
basisc, food tariffs are likely to average 22%.19  
There is little time to negotiate new tariffs, and 
even less to adjust to them.  
b We are not aware of any technological solution to physical border control checks anywhere in the world where there is a need 
for import controls. See Section 2.3 below, too.
c World Trade Organisation (WTO) arrangements apply to countries outside the EU which export into the EU. 
The realities of the ROI / NI 
terrestrial (food) border 
When and if the UK leaves the Single Market and 
Customs Union, and in the absence of any agreed 
alternative, this will inevitably entail re-establishing 
border controls between ROI and NI. Or, if NI is 
to retain its seamless border with the ROI, the 
border must be located in the Irish Sea, i.e. at ports 
in ROI or in ports such as Heysham in England, 
Holyhead, Fishguard and Pembroke in Wales, or 
Cairnryan in Scotland. The only seamless border for 
ROI food exports would require abandoning what 
are relatively short (2-4 hour) ferry crossings from 
Ireland to Wales and replacing them with 14-18 
hour sailings from Ireland to North West France. 
Inevitably, this would add considerable costs to ROI 
businesses and their overseas customers. 
Main shipping route options are given in Table 1. 
These are the vital sea passages for food ‘trunker’ 
routes which maintain the food flows from and into 
NI and ROI.
HMRC data show that in 2015 the largest 
component of traded goods from NI to ROI 
conveyed in UK-registered Heavy Goods Vehicles, 
by volume, consisted of food and drink products 
(770,000 tonnes). Food and drink products were 
also the third-largest group of commodities 
traded, by volume, from ROI to NI in 2015 (460,000 
tonnes).20  Cross-border trade is also highly 
integrated. For instance, 27% of the milk produced 
in NI is processed in ROI, and 42% of NI sheep and 
lambs are processed in ROI. 
A study carried out in 2016 illustrated the 
integrated and inter-dependent nature of food 
businesses along the border region of the Counties 
Armagh and Down (NI) and Louth and Monaghan 
(ROI).21  That report focused on 68 mainly small-
scale agri-food and related businesses in these 
four border counties. Its purpose was to provide 
FRC Food Brexit Policy Briefing
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Port in Ireland Port in Britain Shipping lines Sailings Duration (approx.)
Larne (NI) Cairnryan (Scotland) P&O 7 daily 2 hours
Belfast (NI) Cairnryan (Scotland) Stena 5 daily 2 hours 15 mins
Belfast (NI) Liverpool  Birkenhead (England) Stena 2 daily 8 hours
Belfast (NI) Heysham (England) Stena 2 Daily 8 hours 15 mins
Warrenpoint (NI) Heysham (England) Seatruck Ferries 16 weekly 8 hours
Dublin (ROI) Holyhead (Wales) Stena; Irish Ferries 5 daily; 4 daily 2-3 hours
Rosslare (ROI) Fishguard (Wales) Stena 2 daily 3 hours 15 mins
Rosslare (ROI) Pembroke (Wales) Irish Ferries; Stena 14 weekly; 14 weekly 4 hours
Dublin (ROI) Cherbourg (France) Irish Ferries 4 weekly 18 hours
Rosslare (ROI) Roscoff (France) Irish Ferries 2 a week 17 hours 30 mins
Cork (ROI) Roscoff (France) Brittany Ferries 1 a week 14 hours
Rosslare (ROI) Cherbourg (France) Irish Ferries;  Stena 2 per week; 3 per week 18 hours; 17 hours
a snapshot of the cross-border flows of produce, 
workers and customers. Those businesses included 
independent producers, suppliers, food retailers, 
restaurants and hotel restaurants. The main 
findings were as follows: 
• Of 22 producers interviewed for the study, 
eight (36%) exported to the other jurisdiction 
on the island of Ireland.
• The predominant direction of the flow of 
cross-border trade of agri-food produce is 
from North to South (i.e. NI to ROI).
• On the production side, businesses in Armagh 
and Down involved in cross-border trade 
reported sustained growth in their sales to 
Ireland, accounting for up to 30% of their 
total sales. In contrast, the producers based 
in counties Louth and Monaghan stated that 
their volume of trade with the market in NI 
accounted in most cases for less than 1% in 
some and less than 3% in others. 
• 14 of the 22 producers (64%) interviewed for 
the study stated that they were not involved in 
any external trade and that their market was 
exclusively internal to their domestic market. 
There were no examples found of a business 
not engaging in cross-border trade, but 
involved in exports elsewhere. 
• Five of nine hotel restaurants served some 
produce originating in the other jurisdiction. 
However, there was a significant imbalance, 
with three out of four hotel restaurants in ROI 
serving some produce from NI, whereas only 
two out of five hotels in NI served some Irish 
produce.
• This study suggests that, if the ‘Red Line’ 
was drawn – whether by default or intent 
– between NI and the ROI, it would be 
economically punitive for NI’s SME agri-food 
sector in border regions. 
Table 1. Main Shipping routes Ireland-Britain, with indicative sailings and duration. Source: company websites /
Freight Facts/authors.22
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The NI food market is hugely 
important for commerce and 
consumers
The NI retail grocery market (mostly, but not only 
food) is worth an annual £3.1bn.23  According to 
Kantar WorldPanel, 735,000 NI households on 
average spend about £82 per week on food. In 
2012-17, the market grew by 4.5%.24  Like other 
parts of the UK, affected by austerity, NI has seen 
a switch from branded to private-label goods. NI 
shoppers spend 43.5% of their food spending on 
ambient (i.e. room-temperature) or fresh goods. 
They have got used to seamless, fast flowing, 
just-in-time delivery systems; this means a 
ceaseless flow of trucks crossing borders. As was 
noted earlier, 680,000 tonnes of food flow across 
the Irish Sea in each direction every year.25 The 
retailers feeding the NI population are given in 
Table 2. Three British-based supermarket chains, 
Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury, have 69.5% of sales. 
One German chain has 5.4% and is growing. Their 
potential political leverage in Food Brexit and NI 
should be considerable.
 
The NI food and drink manufacturing sector is NI’s 
most important manufacturing industry – as food 
processing now is for the UK as a whole.26,27  The 
sector employs 100,000 people, 22,000 directly 
and 78,000 more in farming and support services 
across NI. The agriculture and food processing 
sectors in NI are a vital part of the NI economy, 
collectively accounting for around 70,000 local 
jobsd and 3.25% of NI’s Gross Value Added (GVA), 
which equates to £1.1bn at basic prices.28 On this 
basis alone, agri-food warrants frontline attention 
from the UK Government.
Total annual sales from the NI food and drink 
processing sector are valued at £4.5bn. With sales 
of £1.15bn, the EU is the largest export market for 
NI. Of this total, £700m relates to trade with ROI. 
It is little wonder that Declan Billington, Chair of 
the Northern Ireland Food & Drink Association 
d Includes farmers, spouses, farm workers, total direct employees and agency employment in food and drink processing  
– based on 47,979 total farmers and workers and 23,557 food and drink processing full time and employment agency workers.
(NIFDA), has stated that ‘clearly the EU, and 
Ireland in particular, are important markets for 
agri-food’.29  But post-Brexit: ‘28% of our sales will 
be subject to trade arrangements that have yet to 
be agreed. A total of 92,000 jobs could also be 
put at risk, if Brexit goes wrong’.30 
In 2013 the NI Agri-Food Strategy Board published 
the Going for Growth agri-food strategy.31 This 
identified food as a key future driver for the 
economic development of NI.32 It set out a 
vision of ‘…growing a sustainable, profitable and 
integrated agri-food supply chain, focused on 
delivering the needs of the market’.33  Although 
the Board has been disbanded, the strategy 
is assumed to remain in place. If it is dropped 
once power sharing resumes (or is dropped 
by the UK Government in lieu), this would be a 
highly significant shift of policy. We, therefore, 
suggest that a Food Brexit which takes NI out 
of the Single Market and Customs Union will 
constitute a similarly radical disjunction. If so, the 
NIFDA chairman is surely correct to state that a 
commercially workable and comprehensive trade 
agreement between the UK and Europe must be 
arrived at. He has said: ‘this should secure a tariff 
free trade deal with the EU or, if not possible, 
strike tariffs at a level that allows industry in 
the UK to efficiently expand and displace EU 
imports’.34
Table 2. Retailer market share, Northern Ireland, mid 
2017. Source: Kantar WorldPanel, June 2017.35
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Table 3. NI food & drink processing sector - destinations and values of subsector sales, by subsector. Source: DARD 
(2016).36
Table 4. Northern Ireland imports and exports with the Republic of Ireland, by sector, in 2015 (£ million). Source: 
Regional Trade Statistics / HMRC in HM Government (2017).37
Total sales 
2014 (£m)
Exports to ROI 
(£m)
Other EU sales 
(£m)
ROI and EU 
combined (£m) 
and as % of 
total sales
Rest of World 
sales (£m) and 
as % of total 
sales
Animal by-products 51.2 * * * *
Bakeries 286.1 72.8 * 72.8 (25%) *
Beef and sheepmeat 1,244.2 98.4 122.7 221.1 (18%) 19.5 (2%)
Drinks 416.1 146.8 13.4 160.2 (38%) 19.6 (5%)
Eggs 139.4 * * * 0
Fish 77.1 6.5 21.2 27.7 (36%) 2.3 (3%)
Fruit and vegetables 308.6 56.2 0.9 57.1 (18%) 0.7 (0.2%)
Milk and milk products 994 149.6 243.3 392.9 (39%) 64.3 (6%)
Pigmeat 320.9 68 * 68 (21%) *
Poultrymeat 706 94 * 94 (13%) *
Total Sector 4,543.6 708.2 440.9 1,149.1 (25%) 140.3 (3%)
Product Sector Exports from NI to ROI (£m)
Imports into NI 
from ROI (£m)
Food & live animals 732 796
Beverages & tobacco 116 73
Crude materials, inedible except fuels 88 114
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 54 69
Animal & vegetable oils, fats and waxes 16 15
Chemical & related products 179 200
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 374 272
Machinery & transport equipment 295 918
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 352 209
Commodities & transactions not elsewhere classified 10 7
TOTAL 2,217 2,673
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NI’s food trade connections, 
especially with ROI, are 
economically vital3637
ROI’s agricultural and NI’s food sectors must 
not be cut off from their main trading partners. 
Agricultural and food products account for the 
largest share of cross-border trade on the island 
of Ireland, with activity spanning the supply chain, 
a high percentage of locally sourced materials and 
a substantial export market.38 Table 3 provides 
details of where NI’s food trade goes and its 
economic value. The most valuable by far is 
beef and sheepmeat, followed by milk and dairy 
products, then poultry. Table 4 gives NI imports 
and exports in 2015 with the ROI, by sector, in 
2015.39  It shows how significant food trade is 
within the NI economy.
GB is the biggest single market for the entire food 
and drink processing sector in NI. However, ROI is 
the largest export market, accounting for 55% of 
exports. The rest of the EU is a significant export 
market for the beef and sheepmeat, and the milk 
and milk products subsectors, accounting for 10% 
and 24% of total sales respectively. The rest of the 
world, which refers to those countries outside the 
EU, accounts for a relatively small proportion of 
export sales across all subsectors.
When and if the UK leaves the Single Market and 
Customs Union, or fails to agree an alternative, 
this will affect:
• Around a third of milk from NI cows that is 
transported across the border into ROI for 
production into butter, cheese and infant 
formula.
• Around 40% of the lamb produced in NI, 
which is shipped south, and much of which 
then makes its way on to France, some coming 
back into NI, and all of it coming to GB if only 
in transit to the continent. 
These are just two examples. For the food system 
as a whole, the imposition of any restrictions and 
tariffs would spell the end of the ‘all island value 
chain’ approach. This would have immediate 
implications. The Irish Farmers Association, for 
example, has stated: 
‘Brexit presents the most serious threat to 
Irish farming and our agri-food sector in the 
history of the State. With 40% of our food 
exports going to the UK, no other Member 
State and no other sector is as exposed in 
these negotiations. The key priorities for the 
agriculture sector in these negotiations are the 
maintenance of the closest possible trading 
relationship between the UK and EU, while 
preserving the value of the UK market’.40
The Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU) has also said 
that the erection of any barriers to agricultural 
trade between NI and the rest of the UK is a ‘Red 
Line’ for them. This metaphor of ‘Red Lines’ would 
become real with a hard Brexit. Few in NI or ROI 
want this. ROI Irish Farmers’ Association President 
Joe Healy has said that Ireland’s objective in the 
Brexit negotiations must be the maintenance of 
the ‘closest possible’ trading arrangements with 
all of the UK. He has stated:
‘Solving the logistical challenges associated 
with the border is of course important, but the 
real priority for the Irish Government must be 
maintaining the trading arrangements with all 
of the UK. Such a solution would substantially 
mitigate or eliminate any border issues. […] 
While this potentially addresses some of the 
border issues, the proposal does not address 
the economic and trading concerns for farming 
and the agri-food sector, either in Ireland or NI. 
GB is a much larger market for both economies 
than the internal market on the island of 
Ireland’.41
The NI Assembly review of possible Brexit 
considerations for the NI agri-food sector 
concluded that:
• The EU is a significant export market for local 
produce, particularly the ROI, but GB accounts 
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for the greatest proportion of sales outside NI; 
• A number of subsectors are more reliant 
on EU exports (milk and milk products, fish 
and drinks) and as such could face greater 
impacts from trading changes in the UK and 
EU relationship; 
• Exports to the rest of the world beyond the 
EU are relatively small and as such could 
potentially be further developed;
• The level of profitability for a number of sub-
sectors, which is already relatively low, could 
be adversely affected if costs to access the 
EU market increase, and this could potentially 
affect the viability of many businesses.
With the continued uncertainty about the precise 
form of Brexit or where the ‘Red Lines’ might or 
might not be drawn, the risk for NI of leaving the 
EU should not be underestimated. The agri-food 
sector is highly significant in the NI Economy – 
more than for any other region in the UK. NI agri-
food is thus significantly more sensitive to either a 
hard Brexit or a no-deal Brexit than other parts of 
the UK. 
The UK Government promised a ‘frictionless 
border’ at the conclusion of the Phase 1 talks in 
December 2017. We are concerned about how this 
can be delivered. There is currently no physical 
infrastructure and no published or intimated 
plans for what this might look like, let alone work. 
Much more detail is needed on the proposed 
arrangements from the UK Government as a 
matter of urgency.
Where next? Some 
priority issues
Formally, the position is that the UK has triggered 
Article 50 and is due to leave the EU in March 
2019, with the possibility (not finalised) of a 
transition period until the final arrangement starts. 
This is notionally discussed as lasting up to two 
years, but some voices seek that to be longer, 
while others wish departure to be immediate.
A number of macro-level options are possible, 
which have been much discussed. These include: 
emulating others such as Norway (a member 
of the European Economic Area), or Canada or 
Switzerland, or some new variant with more or 
less close trading ties to the EU; or dropping out 
altogether and simply becoming one member 
state within the World Trade Organisation. Many 
difficulties with all these options have been and 
continue to be discussed. 
Our concern is for the NI food system. This briefing 
has already cited a number of positions within 
the agri-food system but outside Government, 
expressing concern at Brexit. From the UK 
Government itself there has been remarkably little, 
other than the formal overview policy paper on NI 
published on August 16, 2017.42  This set out four 
commitments, given in Table 5.
Table 5. UK Government White Paper Commitments on 
Northern Ireland, August 2017. Source: HM Government 
2017 
A To uphold the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agree-
ment in all its parts
B To maintain the Common Travel Area and as-
sociated rights
C To avoid a hard border for the movement of 
goods
D To aim to preserve North-South and East-West 
cooperation, including on energy
It is hard to fathom how these commitments 
can be met in the case of food, when and if NI 
leaves the Single Market and Customs Union. As 
commentators have said, ‘Red Lines’ will almost 
certainly have to be drawn.43  The rest of this 
section therefore explores the consequences of 
different priorities.
Priority 1: Prepare infrastructure 
for NI leaving the single market
That there is a significant amount of food 
travelling across the NI-ROI-GB borders is clear. 
What is less clear at present is what infrastructure 
will be needed when and if the UK leaves the 
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Single Market and Customs Union. That this will 
have immediate and, potentially, adverse effects 
on the agri-food commodities listed in Table 3 
(above) is also clear, as is the potential to affect 
consumers. NI’s (and ROI’s) ease of access to 
EU markets will be altered. Critics would say it 
would be undermined; Brexit supporters would 
say that this could be addressed (see section 2.3 
below). Few say it would actually be improved. It is 
probably safe to say that commitment ‘C’ in Table 
5 (above) will be compromised. Key issues are 
raised by this re-drawing of food borders. The NI 
consuming public and the agri-food industries all 
deserve clarification of which legal structure their 
food will operate to. 
Modern food systems operate within an 
infrastructure which industry knows only too well, 
but of which consumers only become aware when 
it fails. This infrastructure is a mix of physical, 
human and legal entities:
• The physical infrastructure can be visible: 
roads, telecommunications, transport, 
etc. However, for the last 20 years, the 
borders have been invisible, as check points 
disappeared and roads were reconnected. 
• The human infrastructure is via institutions 
such as food law enforcement officers, public 
health specialists, and those whose work is 
to ensure smooth flow of foods, but not at all 
costs. They deliver the baseline for safety and 
health.
• The legal infrastructure is the underpinning. 
There is a food ‘regime’ that provides the 
rules, procedures, inspections and dispute 
mechanisms that enable the authorities to act, 
when and if something goes wrong. 
In practice these three features of infrastructure 
are bound together at present by the EU acquis 
communitaire,44  the array of food regulations and 
procedures which enable food to flow within the 
Single Market. 
Why this matters now is because it is at present 
unclear whether and how NI could have a 
special deal on food regulations that maintains 
frictionless food movement, in line with the 
current EU food safety regulatory regime. 
Politicians so far have talked in fairly abstract 
terms – other than somewhat vague references 
to technology (see section 2.3 below). Any new NI 
arrangements would need to specify whether NI 
continues with bedrock approaches to food safety, 
such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP), introduced across food supply chains 
after the 2000 EU Food Safety White Paper.45  
The references to technical solutions by policy-
makers so far mostly refer to issues such as citizen 
identity and human passports. Currently, the flow 
of foods across internal EU borders operates 
frictionlessly because all Member States operate 
according to the EU rules. If the UK leaves those 
food rules – the entire regulatory regime – what 
replaces them? And if the UK as a whole – or NI 
on its own – still works to those EU rules, what is 
the purpose of leaving the EU, and what rules and 
regime replace it, delivered by what agencies? 
We are not surprised to note that Mr Eamonn 
O’Reilly, head of Dublin Port, is reported to 
have commenced the planning and investment 
necessary for a hard Brexit. Perhaps anticipating 
some erosion of commitments ‘A’ and ‘B’ (see 
Table 5), Dublin Port, the organisation that 
Mr O’Reilly heads, anticipates an increase in 
inspections of all products, including food, from 
200,000 at present to 1 million a year.46  If this is 
the case, delays and cost increases are inevitable. 
Borders add costs which will be passed on to 
consumers one way or another. This consequence 
cannot be fudged; nor should it be ignored.
Our Recommendations
The UK Government and the Northern Ireland 
Administration, either through the Secretary of 
State or senior civil servants in the absence of 
an Executive, must begin parallel investments 
to those being undertaken by Dublin Port. As a 
matter of urgency, plans should be published 
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and debated by relevant bodies. If power-
sharing has recommenced, the Northern Ireland 
Administration as well as the UK Government 
must:
• Identify budgets to pay for the considerable 
investment in infrastructure.
• Initiate consultations with NI agri-food 
industries. 
• Be open with NI consumers about food price 
implications.
• Prepare contingency plans for disruptions to 
‘just-in-time’ food supply chains feeding the NI 
population.
• Ask the new UK Food and Drink Sector 
Council – formed in early 2018 by Defra and 
announced as a national, not just an English 
body – to help plan relevant actions. This 
would be a valuable test for how practical this 
body might be.47 
Priority 2: Maintaining consumer 
confidence
A ‘food fortress NI’ is not a viable option for NI’s 
producers or consumers; food self-sufficiency 
is not feasible. At the extreme, could NI plan for 
a rapid expansion of its internal food market to 
compensate for the loss of exports and imports? 
We think ‘fortress NI’ is extremely unlikely, after 46 
years of integration with other EU Member States’ 
food supplies, and especially since the Good 
Friday Agreement. 
A deciding factor would be consumer confidence 
in the food system. The Consumer Council of 
NI has already stated that confidence has been 
shaken by food scandals over contamination and 
food fraud.48  Fragility of NI consumer confidence 
is not surprising, and it is in line with the 
international experience.49,50,51  More importantly, 
several high-profile incidents – such as the 2008 
Irish pork crisis,52,53  and the 2013 horsemeat 
scandal54  – had their origins in parts of NI 
and the ROI. It would be risky for the Devolved 
Administration or UK Government to assume that 
the NI population would ‘keep calm and carry on’. 
Research suggests that NI consumers have been 
seeking authentic, high-quality produce with clear 
quality and provenance credentials. 55
In the time available – one year to Brexit, plus a 
possible (but uncertain) two years of transition 
– it is almost impossible for NI to gear up a food 
supply system which could deliver on the demand 
for authenticity and trust from within NI borders. 
Inevitably we believe that NI remains, to a 
considerable extent, dependent on food supplies 
from GB, ROI and other EU Member States. In the 
preparation of this briefing, we sought data from 
several sources in order to ascertain the level 
of this dependence, i.e., data concerning food 
‘imports’ into NI. We know, for example, that 70% 
of NI food sales are controlled by three British-GB 
based supermarket chains. Their supply chains are 
currently geared to seamless transit.56 
Our Recommendations
• NI policy-makers, politicians and food 
companies must be open with consumers 
and confirm that NI does not currently, and is 
unlikely post-Brexit to be able to, feed itself. 
• Import data concerning food imported into NI, 
whether via ROI or GB, should be published.
• If politicians want the NI agri-food sector to 
continue to grow at the steady rate that it has, 
a commitment to free flow of food must be 
paramount.
Priority 3: Electronic passporting 
should be investigated but is 
unlikely to be a technical fix for 
cross-border flows
Might technology resolve the problem of ‘Red 
Lines’ and currently perceived (im)practicalities of 
food inspections at borders when and if the whole 
of the UK, including NI, leaves the Customs Union? 
This section first summarises the problem to 
which electronic passporting is sometimes offered 
as the solution; and then it considers the matter of 
timing.
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As a result of 40 years of membership of the EU, 
both the food industry and consumers within the 
UK rely on goods, materials and food products 
being available at the factory or supermarket 24 
hours per day. Much of these consumables are 
delivered on a ‘just-in-time’ basis, which has been 
made possible by systems and procedures built 
on the Single European Market and lubricated by 
complex logistics management. Most NI food sales 
are of food produced in the EU, to EU regulations 
and standards for trade and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (i.e. hygiene) controls (it is not clear 
whether the UK will come out of the SPS system). 
The Single Market (actively promoted by Prime 
Minister Mrs Thatcher) facilitated unhindered 
flows of food (and all other commodities) across 
borders, and instituted a system of responsibilities 
along food chains.57  This was modified by the 
EU 2000 Food Safety White Paper,58  following 
food safety crises, which essentially introduced 
a food system applying Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP), the risk-management 
system pioneered by NASA for food safety in space 
flight, and a panoply of related structures such 
the Rapid Alert System to ensure unsafe foods 
can be recalled.59  There are, as a result of all 
this, absolutely no border checks or inspections 
at the NI/ROI border in respect of food safety or 
standards of food deriving from the EU. Neither 
are any such checks or inspections carried out 
at the port of entry onto the island, whether 
in NI or ROI, for EU food products, as long as 
supporting documentation is clear and in order. 
This single market enables rapid transportation of, 
for example, soft fruits from Spain and Portugal, 
salads from Holland and a plethora of other crops 
which are harvested elsewhere in the EU and 
arrive on NI (and other UK) supermarket shelves 
within 2-3 days of being harvested.
The UK Government’s White Paper on future 
customs arrangements post-Brexit states that 
the intention is to keep the flow of goods and 
materials as: ‘…frictionless as possible’ (page 
10, para 44) and, to that end, some form of 
electronic passporting will be used.60 The same 
White Paper refers specifically to: ‘…increased 
automation and better use of data’. (page 9, para 
35) No details were given for when this might be 
delivered, by whom, after which trials, or about 
its applicability to the food system. Published NI 
Budgets make no specific allocations for such 
technical developments.61 The UK Government’s 
London-based Department for International Trade 
has, however, promised to help NI businesses – 
presumably including NI agri-food – to seek new 
‘global markets’.62  This will be welcomed within NI, 
but does not resolve the more immediate NI/ROI 
borders issues. 
Our conclusion is that the UK Government’s 
promise, whilst sounding plausible, lacks real 
substance. Indeed, the Legatum Institute, a 
prominent pro-Brexit think-tank with close links 
to UK Government and funded by a Dubai-
based hedge fund billionaire originally from New 
Zealand,63  has even made a public call for: ‘a 
prize for technological solutions to incentivise 
the development of innovative solutions from 
the private sector, and universities’.64 It is 
safe to assume that if a prize to encourage 
technical development is mooted, no technical 
fix is currently available to turn large-scale 
electronic passporting into reality within the UK 
Government’s political timetable.
The EU has many trade deals with non-EU 
countries, through which the UK already has 
agreed access. And since 2013, the European 
Commission has been exploring how to ease 
border crossings further, through the Smart 
Borders programme.65 This experienced cost and 
other problems, but it continues to be developed. 
A test was conducted across 12 countries and 
reported in 2015, but this was mostly focussed 
on human crossings rather than food or goods.66  
With regard to NI Food Brexit, the point to note 
is that this kind of EU project is mostly designed 
to favour EU members rather than newly external 
traders such as the UK after Brexit. That said, some 
aspects of what is learned might well be of use, 
and should be monitored, if and when the UK 
leaves the EU. 
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Another issue to monitor is the potential for ‘Free 
Zones’. In the European Commission’s own words, 
Free Zones are:
‘[…] enclosed areas within the Customs territory 
of the Union where non-Union goods can be 
introduced free of import duty, other charges (e.g. 
taxes) and commercial policy measures. [...] Union 
goods may also be entered into or stored, moved, 
used, processed or consumed in free zones. Such 
goods may afterwards be exported or brought into 
other parts of the customs territory of the Union.’67 
This might be a useable policy mechanism for 
food. It would depend on NI retaining capacity 
and resources for food inspection and clearance, 
and would be subject to whatever regime is 
agreed during the exit negotiations. Clearly, such 
a situation would still be disruptive to present 
food inspections and flows, but it might avoid 
the ‘hard-border’ scenario. It might also prove to 
be politically unacceptable to all sides, of course. 
Such thinking is for the future and not applicable 
in the immediate circumstances posed by the 
need for frictionless borders. 
The scale of what is required is huge. Before 
the Brexit Referendum, HMRC was intending 
an overhaul of CHIEF, its customs clearance 
computerised system. This was developed to deal 
with the 60 million clearances a year (not just of 
food). Post Brexit, it might have to deal with 300 
million.68  
With over 270 border crossing points between NI 
and ROI, planning needs to be under way now to 
address how the flow of goods, materials, people 
and food is to be managed, security maintained 
and the potential for criminality reduced – 
particularly at the small crossing points, the tracks 
and minor roads, which are likely to become 
targets to be exploited. The establishment 
of border posts, the provision of appropriate 
personnel, including additional trained and 
competent environmental health professionals 
together with appropriate equipment and 
technological support, all need to be planned 
and budgeted for if uncertainty and potential 
criminality is to be avoided.
With food contracts being signed from March 
2018 to apply to foods delivered after March 
2019, when Brexit is scheduled to happen, the 
lack of a technical fix must be viewed with great 
concern and makes this an issue requiring urgent 
attention. Port Health Inspectors have explained 
that no such system currently exists anywhere 
in the world. Moreover, since the basis of future 
trade arrangements is unclear, no software, let 
alone hardware, can be in place. There would 
need to be electronic ‘boxes’ in lorries, electronic 
or actual paperwork, systems for controls and 
checks. A vast infrastructure currently operates 
to facilitate unhindered food trade within the 
EU – but this is all very ‘light-touch’. Those 
arrangements were put into place under the 
Single Market agreements. Trade agreements with 
countries outside the EU have all been negotiated 
under the umbrella of the EU. There are currently 
approximately 50 trade agreements between 
the EU and other countries. These have food 
inspection systems and terms all agreed and are 
set up to work with EU systems, EU regulations, 
and in line with EU Member States’ operation of 
the EU’s legal system.69 
In 2017, a report from the Institute for Government 
(Implementing Brexit: Customs) drew attention 
to what could happen at just one major UK port 
through which food flows. ‘Operation Stack’ is 
the main way of responding to delays in the 
finely tuned system of lorry traffic throughput at 
Dover.70  Its implementation in June 2015, when 
there was a strike on the French side, meant there 
were business stock losses of £21m a day and 
Kent County Council had costs of £1.5m a day. 
Using Port of Dover experience and estimates, 
the Freight Transport Association calculated that 
every day of disruption at Dover would cause full 
cost losses to the UK economy of up to £250m. 
In 2016, there was talk of building a new, large-
scale lorry park off the M20 to deal with feared 
delays from a hard Brexit, but these are reputedly 
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shelved. These calculations have been done for 
Dover but not for NI. This needs to be rectified.
When there is attention to these issues, it seems 
to split into two channels of thinking. On one side, 
there are those who reiterate that technology can 
resolve the NI/ROI/GB borders. On the other side 
are those who explore that and find it wanting. 
The Home Affairs Committee tried to explore this 
divergence and has expressed concern about this 
critical issue of border flows in and after Brexit.71  It 
referred to National Audit Office and other reviews 
of past computerised and hi-tech solutions 
with some scepticism, noting over-runs, costs 
and failures. The UK was to be part of EU-wide 
development of such technology, but it is unclear 
whether Brexit means the end of that participation. 
Crucially, there appears (as yet) to be no Food 
Brexit experimentation, let alone planning, for 
implementation in the immediate short-term, with 
Brexit looming in March 2019. On the recourse 
to technology as a ‘fix’ for customs in general, 
the Institute for Government concluded soberly: 
‘Ministers must recognise that “innovative, new 
ICT” is not a viable option in the short term and 
focus on upgrading existing systems to cope 
with Brexit’. And wisely, it simply said, ‘there isn’t 
enough time to build new infrastructure’.72  (p.29)
Dr Graham Gudgin, of the think-tank Policy 
Exchange, has dismissed such concerns and is 
not alone in expressing faith in cameras, drones, 
phone apps and GPS monitoring as technologies 
which could enable frictionless passage across 
re-established real borders.73  Interviewed on 
BBC Radio 4 about the capacity of technology 
to resolve the NI border trade issue, Dr Gudgin 
moved fairly quickly into the phraseology of ‘light’ 
borders - not the same thing as ‘frictionless’.74 
Faith in technical solutions also tends to assume 
that all entries into electronic systems would be 
both entirely honest and reliable. Proper food 
inspection requires someone to look inside lorries 
and to make judgements about critical food safety 
and standards. To suggest that there is no need 
for such checks leaves the policy door wider open 
both for unsafe food to enter the system and for 
criminal and fraudulent activities.
People who are not informed about food 
inspections often confuse customs clearance 
with health checks. They should not be conflated. 
The customs clearance tracks the goods as they 
cross borders, to apply tariffs or other traceability 
features, and to answer questions such as:  where 
has the food come from? Where is it going? Is it 
legal? Safety and health checks at borders are 
frontline public health measures designed to 
ensure that the food is fit for human consumption: 
Is it safe? Is it what it says it is? Is it fraudulent? 
Our conclusions are that:
• There will continue to be a need for the 
inspection by trained personnel and for the 
meticulous sampling of foods – particularly 
those of animal origin – using methods which 
meet legal requirements. 
• Technology cannot currently replace 
inspections. Moreover, there are currently 
no inspections carried out on foodstuffs 
originating from within the EU and moving 
across the EU.
• Technology may work in the foreseeable 
future for customs clearance but not for health 
checks.
• There is no current evidence that any all-
embracing system exists that is available for 
roll-out by March 2019 and which meets the 
tests required for food, namely that it should 
be:
a. Practical, well-tested and in running 
order;
b. Capable of immediate application or 
imminent development;
c. Reliable and acceptable for use, i.e. ‘fit 
for purpose’; 
d. Capable of generating robust data for 
legal use and scrutiny;
e. Accepted at the international level.
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Our Recommendations
We do not dismiss technology. Our point is that 
viable technical solutions - meeting the conditions 
given in the preceding paragraph - to the political 
problem do not yet appear to be available. Under 
these circumstances, we recommend:
• Food and logistics industries involved in 
transporting and selling food in NI should 
be clear and transparent with the UK public, 
including NI, about the effects of delays at UK 
ports of entry.
• The UK Government should publish detailed, 
costed plans - which can be applied to 
contracts from March 2018 - for how to recruit, 
train and deploy professionally qualified 
personnel to ensure food entering NI from 
the EU and beyond meets the terms of the 
Food Safety Acts 1990 and 1999, and all 
relevant legislation enacted since by the Wales 
Assembly Government, Scottish Government 
and NI Assembly. 
• The UK Government should desist from 
promulgating electronic pass-porting or 
other everyday technologies as fixes for 
‘frictionless’ borders, unless and until it funds 
and satisfactorily concludes proper trials 
and roll-out of well-tested technology that is 
internationally accepted.
• Independent researchers in the private 
sector and universities should consider 
the practicalities of sustaining current and 
putative food regulatory regimes after Brexit.
Priority 4: NI public health 
must be a key element in 
maintenance of food supply
Although life expectancy in NI has steadily 
increased,75  there are major problems with NI 
diet-related health. Life expectancy is 1.3 years 
lower for males in NI than in for males in England 
and 0.7 years lower for females.76  As with the 
rest of the UK, there are significant geographical 
disparities in life expectancy within NI. Belfast has 
the lowest life expectancy – 75.9 years for males; 
whereas in Lisburn and Castlereagh male life 
expectancy is 79.9 years.77 
The National Diet and Nutrition Surveys (NDNS) 
for NI 2015 and 2017 show NI consumption 
patterns to be less healthy than the rest of the 
UK78. The 2017 NDNS update showed:
• Fruit and vegetable consumption in NI was 
significantly lower than in the UK as a whole: 
82% of adults, 77% of older adults and 96% of 
children aged 11 to 18 years in NI did not meet 
the five-a-day recommendation. 
• Mean intakes of non-starch polysaccharide 
(NSP) (fibre) were significantly lower than 
those in the UK as a whole, and for adults 
were below the recommended level of 18g per 
day. 
• Mean consumption of oil-rich fish was well 
below the recommended level, 140g portion 
per week, and significantly lower than in the 
UK as a whole. 
• Mean consumption of red and processed 
meat for men and boys aged 11 to 18 
years exceeded the current maximum 
recommendation for adults. 
• Mean intakes of saturated fat exceeded 
recommendations in all age groups and were 
similar to or slightly higher than mean intakes 
in the UK as a whole. 
• A third of adults aged 19 to 64 years in NI 
had low blood levels of vitamin D, a higher 
proportion than in the UK as a whole. 
• The lowest income group had lower fruit 
and vegetable consumption than those in 
the highest income group. They also had 
lower intakes of NSP and some vitamins and 
minerals
There are historic reasons for these food cultural 
and public health inequalities, which are beyond 
the scope of this Briefing. The NI population is 
eating too much meat and dairy products, not 
enough fish, and far too little fruit and vegetables 
than is good for population health. It should 
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be noted, however, that the Single Market has 
generally been a force for good by improving 
NI access to a key requirement for good health 
– namely fresh fruit and vegetables.  To disrupt 
the flow of or, in extremis, to cut NI off from EU-
derived fruit and vegetables would harm public 
health.
Our Recommendations
• NI must not only maintain but actively improve 
its population’s access to the ingredients for 
diet-related health, particularly an increase 
in production, trade and consumption of fruit 
and vegetables. 
• If there is a hard Brexit, the consequences 
should be carefully monitored by public health 
agencies.
• Efforts should be made to increase production 
and consumption of NI-grown fruit and 
vegetables; whichever form of Food Brexit 
emerges.
• A hard Brexit will further highlight and 
illuminate the gaps between NI’s current food 
output and what a more sustainable food 
output would need to be. For example, NI 
currently produces an excess of red meat and 
dairy and not enough fruit and vegetables to 
meet, let alone exceed, health requirements. 
This could become critical in the event 
of unavoidable barriers to EU imports of 
commodities essential to a balanced diet as a 
result of hard Brexit.
Priority 5: The Good Friday 
(Peace) Agreement requires 
maintenance of cross-border 
food flows
The relations between NI and ROI was a key - 
component of the Brexit Phase 1 negotiations, 
because of the huge ramifications for the Good 
Friday Agreement and the NI peace process that 
might arise from the UK’s departure from the 
e i.e. the eastern borders of Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania.
EU. Surprisingly, for many observers outside the 
island, there is a fairly low level of awareness 
of the significance of this issue. It is therefore 
important to understand why this is relevant to 
Food Brexit:
• The Good Friday Agreement, also known as 
the Belfast Agreement, is an international 
treaty involving both the UK and Ireland, 
signed on 10 April 1998.79  It is for that reason 
that the Irish Government (along with the UK 
and EU Negotiators) was and are involved in 
the Brexit discussions.
• EU membership of both its signatories - the 
UK and Ireland governments - was central to 
its construction and the implementation of the 
freer flows of food (and other goods) between 
ROI, NI and GB.
• The current border between NI and the ROI is, 
to all intents and purposes, invisible because 
of the provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement. Before that agreement, there were 
restrictions on the number of crossing points, 
and border checks on people and goods, even 
though both jurisdictions were, and currently 
still remain, part of the EU. The ‘hard’ border 
that existed from the 1970s until the late 
1990s was for (military) security rather than for 
customs reasons. 
Will Food Brexit make the ‘invisible’ border visible 
and tightly constrained again - regardless of 
whether Food Brexit is hard or soft? 
Some border facts underline the complexity and 
delicacy:
• At the eastern edge of the EUe,  there are 137 
land border crossings in total, spanning 3,720 
miles/6,000 km of border.80 
• On the island of Ireland there are 275 land 
border crossings between NI and ROI along 
300 miles of border roads.81 
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• 23,000 -30,000 people use these 275 
crossings every day to travel to and from work.
• During the conflict known as the ‘Troubles’, 
from the 1970s to the 1990s, there were only 
20 crossings.
The historical border between NI and ROI, 
particularly through past conflict, has left a 
legacy of fear and tension, particularly amongst 
border communities. In a recent study conducted 
by Queens University Belfast (QUB), for many 
respondents the very term ‘border control’ 
conjured images of a securitised border and 
recalled deeply negative experiences and 
community tensions.82 
The implications of a return to tight border 
controls, and the infrastructure that would 
inevitably accompany them, are well understood 
in terms of both security on the island and risks to 
the NI peace process. Police forces on both sides 
of the NI/ROI border have expressed concerns 
about the consequences of re-imposing border 
controls.83  Chief Constable George Hamilton of 
Police Service of NI (PSNI) has already been widely 
reported as stating that the more infrastructure 
there is at the border, the more this incentivises 
dissident groupings and other organised gangs to 
become involved in cross border crimes such as 
smuggling and other crime such as food fraud.84 
The need for free movement of foods (and other 
goods) in order to support the agri–food sector 
in both parts of the island of Ireland is clear. The 
same applies to the Good Friday Agreement in 
relation to free movement of people, the Common 
Travel Area commitment referred to earlier in this 
Briefing. 
Prior to Christmas 2017, all parties involved in 
the Brexit negotiations – the UK Government, 
the EU and the Irish Government – pledged their 
commitment to the maintenance of the current 
‘frictionless’ border and no return to the hard 
border infrastructure of the past that has so many 
f   This Briefing has been written and published as negotiations continue. Circumstances may change. 
other implications for this island. At present, with 
the Brexit Phase 2 clock ticking, there appears to 
be no agreed (or published) delivery mechanism.f  
Our Recommendations
• Whatever Food Brexit it aspires to, the UK 
Government should inform the NI population 
exactly how it intends to meet and protects 
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
• The EU and ROI should commit to doing all 
they can to allow free flow of food for both NI 
and ROI.
Conclusions: Food 
Brexit’s implications for 
the NI food system need 
urgent attention
This Briefing highlights the importance of 
food, and trade in food (not just agriculture), 
for NI. It salutes those working discreetly to 
ensure minimum destabilisation of food flows. 
Nevertheless, it has raised fundamental choices 
that policy-makers and the public must make. 
The consequences of disruption to food flows are 
serious enough for any population; for a territory 
and people with a history of border-related 
conflict and who have enjoyed peace for the last 
20 years, to have this threatened is a matter of 
serious concern. And the risk is not just for them 
but for the rest of the UK, Ireland and all who trade 
food with them. 
General Recommendations 
Section 1 explored the realities of the Food Brexit 
‘problem’ for NI. Section 2 considered some 
salient ‘solutions’ and made recommendations 
in relation to each of them. We now give some 
overarching recommendations on the Implications 
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of Food Brexit for NI. These link the broad 
concerns about food flows with the specifics of 
food inspections.
• The NI food system urgently needs some 
clear decisions on Food Brexit, which it 
is not at present receiving; this failure of 
food governance should not be allowed to 
continue. The GB public and Government must 
realise it cannot ignore these significant issues 
about Food Brexit for either the UK as a whole 
or NI in particular. 
• The commitment to a ‘frictionless border’ 
cannot be fudged. Either NI is in the Single 
Market or Customs Union (or an alternative 
that is agreed by all parties) or it is not. If not, 
border controls are inevitable (and are being 
prepared for).
• The ideological fissures must, at the same 
time, be put aside to ‘think food’. The big 
choices must be explored through the policy 
‘lens’ of food. They are: 
a. to  reverse the commitment to leave the 
Customs Union and Single Market; 
b. to stay in the Customs Union in 
alignment with current EU rules and 
supply chain approaches; 
c. to mutually develop and agree a 
customs arrangement between the 
islands of Ireland and GB and the rest of 
the EU;
d. to impose ‘Red Lines’ at one 
geographical point or the other. 
• There needs to be a specific Food Plan for NI 
in the context of Brexit. The lack of discussion 
about food (rather than agriculture) is a 
serious policy deficiency. Options must be 
open, costed and explored by policy-makers. 
MPs and Select Committees must redouble 
efforts to get the UK Government to be open 
about its food plans.
• The European Commission should seek 
clarification from the UK Government on 
the general food status of NI, particularly 
its reliance on food imports and exports. 
The European Commission must provide 
clear guidance to the NI consuming public 
and agri-food industries about the practical 
implications of options for food flows.
• Members of the UK Parliament, the National 
Assembly for Wales and the Scottish 
Parliament should pressurise the UK 
Government to keep NI’s borders with both 
the ROI and GB open and frictionless.
• Aspirations for technology to resolve food 
inspections and quality controls at borders 
are too vague and unspecific. No immediate 
faith should be put into technical fixes for the 
pass-porting problem. This might or might 
not be possible in the future but does not 
exist for now. Nor does it replace the need for 
food inspection by qualified and competent 
professionals. Detailed plans for how 
inspections might be managed are required. 
The NI Select Committee, together with the 
EFRA Committee, should conduct an Inquiry 
into the state of Government investment in 
this sphere. They and MPs should also seek 
clarification as to whether trials are underway 
or contracts signed for technical controls at 
borders, and should ask about feasibility, cost 
and function.
• The three dominant food retail companies in 
NI have particular responsibilities that go with 
their economic power to prevent NI’s food 
system being cut off from both the ROI and 
GB. The existence of their forward planning 
options to address Brexit issues should be 
reviewed by open processes such as by a 
Select Committee. We urge the big food 
companies who currently ‘feed’ NI to redouble 
efforts to maintain food flows into NI. 
• Food industry forward contracts and 
purchasing agreements for delivery in March 
2019 are already beginning. Whatever the 
wider political decisions about the status of NI, 
there must be a decent period of adjustment 
where things carry on as before, giving at 
least two years’ notice for businesses to make 
the necessary arrangements for their food 
supply. Disruption to food supplies would be 
unacceptable.
• Food inspection bodies, Environmental 
Health Practitioners, Port Health Officers, 
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Customs Officers and other trade and health-
related professions cannot resolve political 
difficulties, nor should responsibility for 
resolving the practicalities be placed at their 
door. Their responsibilities are to the common 
good and the public’s safety and health; this 
requires that local authorities, relevant actors 
in the food system and all democratic bodies 
are aware of the significance for food, whether 
there is a hard Brexit or not. Leaving the Single 
Market and Customs Union – if that remains 
the likely outcome – requires contingency 
planning. 
• The UK Government and the Devolved 
Administrations should undertake and publish 
studies which calculate needs for resources, 
funding, technical equipment and scientific 
staff to provide the requisite public health 
and trade infrastructure to meet the previous 
recommendation. 
• We trust that emergency procedures are in 
place and that the UK Government’s COBRA 
system is preparing for all eventualities. If the 
head of Dublin Port is doing so, COBRA should 
do so, too. Public reassurances must be based 
on open evidence.
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